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Abstract
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game has been studied to account for
cyclic behaviour under various game dynamics. We use a two-person
parametrised version of this game to illustrate how cyclic behaviour is
a dominant feature of the replicator dynamics. The cyclic behaviour
is observed near a heteroclinic cycle, in a heteroclinic network, with
two nodes such that, at each node, players alternate in winning and
losing. This cycle is shown to be as stable as possible for a wide range
of parameter values. The parameters are related to the players’ payoff
when a tie occurs.
JEL codes: C72, C73, C02
Keywords: price setting, rock-scissors-paper game, cyclic dynamics, stabil-
ity
1 Introduction
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game (henceforth, RSP) has been used to model
behaviour and learning in the framework of evolutionary game theory in
both economics and the life sciences. This game has three candidate actions:
Rock (R), Scissors (S) and Paper (P) such that R beats S, S beats P and
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P beats R. For the one-person or single-population (symmetric) case it pro-
vides a good two-dimensional model for convergent and oscillating dynamics,
the type of dynamics depending on some parameters of the game.
The RSP dynamics are commonly described in terms of the continuous-
time replicator equations introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978). Such
equations capture biologically a process of natural selection, and economically
a process of learning through imitation of successful behaviours. Players
decide on their strategies by comparing the payoff over possible outcomes
to the average payoff. A payoff higher than average may be achieved by
copying a predominant strategy (choice of the better – not best – reply) or
by selecting the strategy that produces the highest payoff (choice of the best
reply).
During play the state of each player is a mixed strategy over the set
of actions from the two-dimensional simplex – the individual state space –
whose vertices are the pure strategies, i.e. the actions themselves R, S and
P. The replicator dynamics for the symmetric RSP game assumes that the
payoffs for each action are the same for all players in the interaction. This
reduces the analysis to one player, which has been done by Zeeman (1980).
A noteworthy result is that the one-person RSP game does not exhibit iso-
lated limit cycles.1 Generically, two kinds of robust long-term behaviour are
predicted depending on the payoffs. The player state evolves either towards
the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium corresponding to coexistence of
all three actions, or towards the heteroclinic cycle on the boundary of the
two-dimensional simplex. A heteroclinic cycle consists of equilibria of the
dynamical system and solution trajectories connecting them. It induces per-
sistent cycling characterised by progressively longer residing times in each
equilibrium so that the player will sequentially play R→ P→ S→ R never
stopping.
We are interested in the existence of cyclic dominance under coupled
(asymmetric) replicator equations in a two-person RSP game. From a strictly
abstract point of view, this has been addressed numerically by Sato et al. (2002,
2005). A dynamic is specified for each player and the game’s state space is
the product of two two-dimensional simplices. Aguiar and Castro (2010)
show that the game dynamics support a heteroclinic network made of nine
pairs of pure strategies reflecting all possible sequences of play along the state
space. This heteroclinic network can be seen as consisting of
1Other variants of the RSP game can lead to stable limit cycles yielding periodic
oscillatory dynamics of all actions that favor long-term coexistence. See, for instance,
Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) with the extension to best response dynamics, and
Mobilia (2010) and Toupo and Strogatz (2015) in the context of populations under muta-
tions.
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(a) three heteroclinic cycles, one of which involves alternate win-loss of
both players, and the other two involve loss-tie by only one of the
players;
(b) two heteroclinic cycles in which play goes through loss-tie-win by only
one of the players.
In this paper, we address stability of cyclic behaviour in the RSP interac-
tion for two assymmetric players through the stability of a heteroclinic cycle.
The asymmetry between players results from their different valuations of the
payoff for a tie. Although heteroclinic cycles in a heteroclinic network cannot
be asymptotically stable, they can exhibit a strong form of stability, known
as essential asymptotic stability, first introduced by Melbourne (1991). Our
main results describe the stability properties of the three types of heteroclinic
orbits in (a) and (b) as the payoffs for a tie vary. We show that the win-loss
cycle wherein players switch to best responses is essentially asymptotically
stable when the sum of payoffs for a tie is negative. The choice of actions
along this cycle is always made by switching to best responses by both play-
ers. In this case, a tie is not an attractive outcome for at least one player for
whom the payoff is negative and hence, as an outcome, it is avoided. The
win-loss cycle models the existence of alternating dominance between two
players. On the other hand, the loss-tie cycles can be stable in a weaker
sense for certain payoff values, and the loss-tie-win cycles are never stable.
These heteroclinic cycles are therefore harder, or impossible, to observe in
applications and numerical experiments. These illustrate sequences of play
where one player switches to the best response while the other switches to a
better – not best – response.
The dynamics of the two-person RSP game can be very complex and
we do not attempt to find detailed specific applications. We also do not
address the question of whether other sequences of play can be followed.
The heteroclinic cycles above are all such that one player always switches to
the best response while the other does one of three things: (i) switches to a
best response, (ii) switches to a better – not best – response, or (iii) switches
to a better and then to a best response (in this case, the timing of play is
not alternate between players). Behaviour where the latter player does not
choose just one of the alternatives (i)–(iii) is not considered. We venture to
conjecture that these other alternatives do not possess any kind of stability.
The reasons for this conjecture are better understood after reading Section 4,
where we return to this point briefly in the final paragraph.
It is known that a wide variety of choices is allowed but not all may be
realised in play. In the language of dynamical systems, we refer to this as infi-
nite switching, which is shown not to exist in this game (see Olszowiec (2016)
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and Garrido-da-Silva (2018)). We do however hope that this first approach
can open the door to further research in the treatment of game dynamics for
asymmetric contests between two players.
This article is organised as follows: the next section contains preliminary
material which may be skipped by the reader familiar with the dynamics near
heteroclinic networks. Section 3 describes the two-person RSP game and its
heteroclinic cycles. Section 4 provides a thorough study of the stability of all
the heteroclinic cycles in the dynamics. Detailed calculations are deferred to
an appendix, as well as the necessary information to describe the trajectories
of points near each heteroclinic cycle in the RSP network. The last section
concludes.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
Consider a smooth vector field f : Rn → Rn described by a system of differ-
ential equations
x˙ = f (x) , x ∈ Rn. (1)
An equilibrium2 ξ ∈ Rn of (1) satisfies f (ξ) = 0. Given two equilibria ξi and
ξj of (1) a heteroclinic connection [ξi → ξj] is a set of solution trajectories
of (1) which are backward asymptotic to ξi and forward asymptotic to ξj.
A heteroclinic cycle is a flow-invariant set C ⊂ Rn consisting of an ordered
collection of finitely many saddle equilibria {ξ1, . . . , ξm} and connecting tra-
jectories [ξj → ξj+1], j = 1, . . . , m, where ξm+1 = ξ1. A heteroclinic network
is a connected union of finitely many heteroclinic cycles.
We say that f is Γ-equivariant for some finite Lie group Γ acting orthog-
onally on Rn if f (γ · x) = γ · f (x) for all γ ∈ Γ and x ∈ Rn. Each γ ∈ Γ is
called a symmetry of f . Background on differential equations with symmetry
can be found in Golubitsky et al. (1988). The symmetry of a problem can
be used to simplify its study by identifying as one different objects that are
related by symmetry.
The Γ-orbit of x ∈ Rn is the set Γ (x) = {γ · x, x ∈ Γ} . The elements
in the Γ-orbit of an equilibrium of (1) are also equilibria. A group orbit
of an equilibrium is called a relative equilibrium. A heteroclinic connection
between two relative equilibria is itself a heteroclinic connection between two
equilibria, one belonging to the outgoing relative equilibrium and the other
belonging to the incoming one.
2Equilibria are sometimes called fixed points or steady states, and nodes in the context
of heteroclinic dynamics.
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Consider a subset S ⊂ Rn. The set of all Γ-orbits of S is called the
quotient space and is denoted by S/Γ. The flow of f restricts to a flow on
the quotient space S/Γ whenever S is flow-invariant. By identifying each
Γ-orbit of S with a single point in the quotient space S/Γ, we can study the
dynamics on S via the dynamics on S/Γ. This reduces both the dimension
of the state space and the number of nodes comprising of a heteroclinic cycle
or network.
In generic systems, heteroclinic connections between saddles can be bro-
ken by arbitrarily small perturbations. A sufficient condition for preserving
their structure relies on the existence of flow-invariant subspaces. We say
that a heteroclinic cycle C is robust if each heteroclinic connection κj,j+1 is
contained in a flow-invariant subspace Pj such that ξj is a saddle and ξj+1 is a
sink for the flow restricted to Pj, for j = 1, . . . , m. Robust heteroclinic cycles
arise naturally in equivariant systems (e.g. Field 1996) as well as in game
theory and population dynamics (e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). In the
latter flow-invariant subspaces occur in the form of extinction hyperplanes.
It is well known that heteroclinic cycles are visible in applications and
numerical simulations if they are stable. Within a heteroclinic network a het-
eroclinic cycle is never asymptotically stable. In fact, a heteroclinic network
consists of at least two heteroclinic cycles with at least one node in common.
The unstable manifold of such a node takes trajectories to both heteroclinic
cycles. Hence, there are points in a neighbourhood of the common node
that do not follow any given heteroclinic cycle, precluding asymptotic stabil-
ity. The heteroclinic cycle can however exhibit strong attraction properties,
which have been classified into various types of stability, as follows. These
are illustrated in Figure 1.
We use terminology of Podvigina (2012): let S ⊂ Rn be a compact set
invariant under the flow Φt (·) of the system (1), and ǫ, δ > 0. Given a
metric d on Rn, we write
Bǫ (S) = {x ∈ Rn : d(x, S) < ǫ}
for an ǫ-neighbourhood of S and
Bδ (S) =
{
x ∈ Rn : Φt (x) ∈ Bδ (S) for any t ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞
d (Φt(x), S) = 0
}
for the δ-local basin of attraction of S. By ℓ (·) we denote Lebesgue measure
in the appropriate dimension.
Melbourne (1991) introduces the strongest intermediate notion of sta-
bility called essential asymptotic stability, e.a.s. in the sequel. Roughly
speaking, an e.a.s. invariant object attracts all nearby trajectories except for
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ǫx
(a) σloc(x) = +∞
ǫ
x
(b) 0 < σloc(x) < +∞
ǫ
x
(c) −∞ < σloc(x) < 0
Figure 1: The grey region represents the local basin of attraction of a het-
eroclinic cycle in a neighbourhood of a point x in a heteroclinic connection
of the heteroclinic cycle. If for a point x in each heteroclinic connection the
stability index (see Definition 2.4) is σloc(x) = +∞ as in (a), then the hete-
roclinic cycle is a.s. If there exists a heteroclinic connection along which the
stability index is −∞ < σloc(x) < 0 as in (c), then the heteroclinic cycle is
f.a.s. If one stability index is 0 < σloc(x) < +∞ as in (b) and none is as
in (c), then the heteroclinic cycle is e.a.s.
a cuspoidal region of points sufficiently thin for making the former visible
in experiments (see Figure 1(b)). We consider the definition provided by
Brannath (1994):
Definition 2.1 (Definition 1.2 in Brannath (1994)). A compact invariant set
S is essentially asymptotically stable (e.a.s.) if there is a set N with S ⊂ N
(N the closure of N ) such that all trajectories starting in N converge to S
without leaving a prescribed neighbourhood of S and
lim
ǫ→0
ℓ (Bǫ (S) ∩N )
ℓ (Bǫ (S))
= 1.
Aweaker form of attractiveness is established by Podvigina (2012) through
the definition of fragmentary asymptotic stability, f.a.s. in the sequel. In this
case, the set of points attracted to S needs to have positive measure but can
be small (see Figure 1(c)).
Definition 2.2 (Definition 2 in Podvigina (2012)). A compact invariant
set S is fragmentarily asymptotically stable (f.a.s.) if for any δ > 0
ℓ (Bδ (S)) > 0.
Complete instability is formulated as apposed to f.a.s. in Podvigina (2012).
Here the probability of finding a point whose orbit remains close to the het-
eroclinic cycle is zero.
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Definition 2.3 (Definition 3 in Podvigina (2012)). A compact invariant set
S is completely unstable (c.u.) if there exists δ > 0 such that ℓ (Bδ (S)) = 0.
Standard examples of completely unstable invariant sets are provided by
saddle points and sources.
Podvigina and Ashwin (2011) define an index that quantifies the extent
of the local basin of attraction of any compact invariant set S.
Definition 2.4 (Podvigina and Ashwin (2011)). For a compact invariant
set S, a point x ∈ S and ǫ, δ > 0, set
Σǫ,δ (x) =
ℓ (Bǫ (x) ∩ Bδ (S))
ℓ (Bǫ (x))
.
The (local) stability index of S at x is
σloc (x) = σloc,+ (x)− σloc,− (x) ,
where
σloc,− (x) = lim
δ→0
lim
ǫ→0
[
ln (Σǫ,δ (x))
ln (ǫ)
]
, σloc,+ (x) = lim
δ→0
lim
ǫ→0
[
ln (1− Σǫ,δ (x))
ln (ǫ)
]
.
For δ small and fixed before taking the limit, we use the convention that
σloc,− (x) = +∞ if there is an ǫ0 > 0 such that Σǫ,δ (x) = 0 for all ǫ < ǫ0,
and σloc,+ (x) = +∞ if Σǫ,δ (x) = 1 for all ǫ < ǫ0. Therefore, σloc,± (x) ≥ 0
and σloc (x) ∈ [−∞,+∞].
Recall the schematic illustration in Figure 1 where σloc(x) measures the
portion of points in small enough ǫ-neighbourhoods of x ∈ S that are in the
δ-local basin of attraction of S as the neighbourhoods shrink (grey areas in
Figure 1).
It is important to note that the stability index is constant on trajectories
of the flow, see Theorem 2.2 in Podvigina and Ashwin (2011). In particular,
the stability index of a heteroclinic connection [ξi → ξj] can be computed for
an arbitrary point x in [ξi → ξj]. We then describe attraction properties of
heteroclinic cycles and networks by making use of a finite number of indices,
namely the ones along their heteroclinic connections. Theorem 2.4 in Pod-
vigina and Ashwin (2011) allows us to reduce the dimension of the sets that
need to be measured by restricting to a section transverse to the flow.
The following two results relate e.a.s. and f.a.s. to the sign of stability
indices. Set ℓ1 (·) for the 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
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Theorem 2.5 (Theorem 3.1 in Lohse (2015)). Let C ⊂ Rn be a heteroclinic
cycle or network with finitely many equilibria and connecting trajectories.
Suppose that ℓ1 (C) < ∞ and that the stability index σloc (x) exists and is
not equal to zero for all x ∈ C. Then, generically, C is e.a.s. if and only if
σloc (x) > 0 along all connecting trajectories.
Lemma 2.6 (Lemma 2.5 in Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018)). Suppose
that for x ∈ C the stability index σloc (x) is defined. If there is a point x ∈ C
such that σloc (x) > −∞, then C is f.a.s.
In what follows we drop the subscript loc for ease of notation.
3 The Rock-Scissors-Paper game
We examine the long-term dynamics for the two-person Rock-Scissors-Paper
(RSP) game. Each player has three possible actions R (rock), S (scissors) and
P (paper) engaging in a cyclic relation: R beats S, S beats P, P beats R. Our
description of the RSP interaction is based on Sato et al. (2002, 2005) and
Aguiar and Castro (2010): two palyers, say X and Y , simultaneously choose
one action from {R, S,P}. The payoff of the winning action is +1 while the
payoff of the losing action is −1. If a tie occurs with both players choosing the
same action, the respective payoffs are parametrised by quantities εx, εy ∈
(−1, 1). We will assume εx + εy 6= 0 so that the game is not zero-sum. The
normal form representation of the game is given by two normalised payoff
matrices
A =
 0 1− εx −1− εx−1 − εx 0 1− εx
1− εx −1− εx 0
 , B =
 0 1− εy −1− εy−1− εy 0 1− εy
1− εy −1− εy 0
 ,
whose columns and rows respect the order of the actions: R, S, P. Each
element of the matrix A (resp. B) is the payoff of the row player X (resp. Y )
playing against the column player Y (resp. X).
Within the evolution approach the players’ choices are expressed in the
form of state (column) vectors whose components are the probabilities of
playing R, S and P. At time t, these are x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ ∆X for player X
and y = (y1, y2, y3) ∈ ∆Y for player Y , where ∆X and ∆Y denote the unit
simplex in R3 associated to each player. The vectors x and y represent mixed
strategies in game play.
The three vertices of ∆X and ∆Y correspond to pure strategies for which
the player assigns a probability of 1 to each action. We then refer to those
only as R = (1, 0, 0), S = (0, 1, 0) and P = (0, 0, 1).
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The pair (x,y) ∈ ∆ = ∆X × ∆Y describes the state of the game at a
particular time, ∆ being a four-dimensional subset of R6. The dynamics of
play evolves according to the reinforcement learning governed by the coupled
replicator equations3
dxi
dt
= xi
[
(Ay)i − xTAy
]
, i = 1, 2, 3,
dyj
dt
= yj
[
(Bx)j − yTBx
]
, j = 1, 2, 3,
(2)
where (Ay)i and (By)j are, respectively, the ith and jth element of the
vectors Ay and Bx. The products xTAy and yTBx represent the average
payoff for players X and Y , respectively.
The unique Nash equilibrium is (x∗,y∗) =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
at which both
players are indifferent among all three actions. This is also an equilibrium of
the dynamics. As stated in Sato et al. (2005), when the game is zero-sum,
i.e. εx + εy = 0, the Jacobian at the Nash equilibrium has purely imaginary
eigenvalues and (x∗,y∗) is non-hyperbolic. Otherwise, if εx + εy 6= 0, then
(x∗,y∗) is a saddle and trajectories are attracted to a (robust) heteroclinic
network on the boundary of ∆.
There are nine additional equilibria of (2) corresponding to the vertices
of∆, namely (x,y) with x,y ∈ {R, S,P}. All these equilibria are in turn sad-
dle points. The nine vertices together with the edges of ∆ form a heteroclinic
network whose existence is analitically proved by Aguiar and Castro (2010).
This heteroclinic network can be described both as the union of three 6-node
heteroclinic cycles, C0, C1 and C2, with
C0 = [(R,P)→ (S,P)→ (S,R)→ (P,R)→ (P, S)→ (R, S)→ (R,P)]
C1 = [(R, S)→ (R,R)→ (P,R)→ (P,P)→ (S,P)→ (S, S)→ (R, S)]
C2 = [(S,R)→ (R,R)→ (R,P)→ (P,P)→ (P, S)→ (S, S)→ (S,R)] ,
and as the union of two 9-node heteroclinic cycles, C3 and C4, with
C3 = [(R, S)→ (R,R)→ (R,P)→ (S,P)→ (S, S)→ (S,R)→ (P,R)→
→ (P,P)→ (P, S)→ (R, S)]
C4 = [(S,R)→ (R,R)→ (P,R)→ (P, S)→ (S, S)→ (R, S)→ (R,P)→
→ (P,P)→ (S,P)→ (S,R)] .
The two alternative descriptions above allow us to identify three types of
heteroclinic orbits for RSP games. When following
3The superscript T indicates the transpose of a matrix in general.
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• the win-loss cycle, C0, both players switch to best responses;
• the loss-tie cycles, C1 and C2, one player switches to best response, and
the other switches to better, but not best, responses mimicking the first
player’s strategy and resulting in a tie;
• the loss-tie-win cycles, C3 and C4, one player switches to best responses,
and the other switches in two steps, first to the better response and
then to the best response. Players do not make their choices alter-
nately: along C3 player X waits until player Y has moved twice before
considering a new choice of action (along C4 it is player Y who waits
and player X who makes two consecutive choices).
The theoretic behaviour of such a game was briefly investigated by Sato
et al. (2002) via numerical simulations. Aguiar and Castro (2010) addressed
the same problem by making use of equivariant theory.
The vector field associated to (2) is equivariant under the action of the
symmetry group Γ generated by
γ : (x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3) 7→ (x3, x1, x2, y3, y1, y2) .
The Γ-orbits of the equilibria (R,P), (R, S) and (R,R) are, respectively, the
following relative equilibria:
ξ0 ≡ Γ (R,P) = {(R,P) , (S,R) , (P, S)}
ξ1 ≡ Γ (R, S) = {(R, S) , (S,P) , (P,R)}
ξ2 ≡ Γ (R,R) = {(R,R) , (S, S) , (P,P)} .
These represent the three possible outcomes in the game: win, loss and tie.
For example, player X loses at ξ0, wins at ξ1 and ties at ξ2.
Due to symmetry, the dynamics of (2) on R6 can be studied from the
dynamics on the quotient space R6/Γ. The restricted flow to this space
contains the quotient heteroclinic network with one-dimensional heteroclinic
connections between two of the relative equilibria: ξ0, ξ1 and ξ2. The quotient
heteroclinic cycles are described as (see Figure 2)
C0 = [ξ0 → ξ1 → ξ0]
C1 = [ξ1 → ξ2 → ξ1]
C2 = [ξ0 → ξ2 → ξ0]
and
C3 = [ξ0 → ξ1 → ξ2 → ξ0]
C4 = [ξ0 → ξ2 → ξ1 → ξ0] .
Notice that the coordinate hyperplanes as well as all sub-simplices of ∆
are flow-invariant subspaces. In particular, every heteroclinic connection
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ξ0 ξ2
ξ1
(a) C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2
ξ0 ξ2
ξ1
(b) C3 ∪C4
Figure 2: Cycles in the quotient heteroclinic network. Each style identifies
a quotient heteroclinic cycle: (a) C0 is represented by a solid line, C1 by a
dashed line, and C2 by a dash-dot line; (b) C3 is represented by a solid line,
and C4 by a dashed line.
Connection Representative 2-dim space Pij 3-dim vector space Qij
[ξ0 → ξ1] [(R,P)→ (S,P)] {(x1, x2, 0; 0, 0, 1)} {(x1, x2, 0; 0, 0, y3)}
[ξ1 → ξ0] [(S,P)→ (S,R)] {(0, 1, 0; y1, 0, y3)} {(0, x2, 0; y1, 0, y3)}
[ξ1 → ξ2] [(R, S)→ (R,R)] {(1, 0, 0; y1, y2, 0)} {(x1, 0, 0; y1, y2, 0)}
[ξ2 → ξ1] [(R,R)→ (P,R)] {(x1, 0, x3; 1, 0, 0)} {(x1, 0, x3; y1, 0, 0)}
[ξ0 → ξ2] [(S,R)→ (R,R)] {(x1, x2, 0; 1, 0, 0)} {(x1, x2, 0; y1, 0, 0)}
[ξ2 → ξ0] [(R,R)→ (R,P)] {(1, 0, 0; y1, 0, y3)} {(x1, 0, 0; y1, 0, y3)}
Table 1: Flow-invariant subspaces and representatives for heteroclinic con-
nections in the quotient heteroclinic network.
[ξi → ξj], i 6= j = 0, 1, 2, is of saddle-sink type in a two-dimensional boundary
of ∆. Denote this subspace by Pij. Evidently, Pij is not a vector subspace
of R6. For convenience we find a three-dimensional vector subspace of R6,
labelled Qij , also invariant under the flow such that Pij ⊂ Qij and [ξi → ξj]
persists in a robust way. Representatives of all heteroclinic connections in
the quotient heteroclinic network and the respective flow-invariant subspaces
that contain them are listed in Table 1.
4 Stability of the RSP cycles
In this section we establish the overall stability properties of the (quotient)
heteroclinic cycles Cp, p = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, by looking at the stability of the
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individual heteroclinic connections. The behaviour of trajectories passing
close to each heteroclinic cycle is captured by Poincare´ maps defined on
suitable cross sections to the heteroclinic connections. We construct as many
Poincare´ maps around the heteroclinic cycle as the number of its heteroclinic
connections. They characterise accordingly the local basin of attraction of
the heteroclinic cycle in a neighbourhood of each heteroclinic connection,
see (15) of Appendix B.
Due to an appropriate change of coordinates our Poincare´ maps can be
described by a product of matrices called basic transition matrices. Each of
these matrices is related to the dynamics along one heteroclinic connection.
All details can be found in Appendix A.
We compute the stability indices along all heteroclinic connections mak-
ing up of every Cp-cycle by means of the approach of Garrido-da-Silva and
Castro (2018). Their results deal with the calculation of stability indices for
heteroclinic cycles comprised of one-dimensional heteroclinic connections ly-
ing in flow-invariant spaces of equal dimension. We observe that the Cp-cycles
satisfy this assumption for any p.
The main tool in our analysis is the function F index : R3 → [−∞,∞],
given in Definition 3.8 in Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018), which can be
related to the stability index in Definition 2.4 as follows: suppose that the
intersection of the local basin of attraction of a compact invariant set S with
a cross section transverse to the flow at x ∈ S is given by{
(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 : max {|x1|, |x2|, |x3|} < δ and |xα11 xα22 xα33 | < 1
}
forα = (α1, α2, α3) ∈ R3 and δ > 0 small. The functionα 7→ F index (α) is the
local stability index for S at x relative to this intersection, i.e. F index (α) =
σloc(x). See Appendix B.1 for the explicit form of F
index (α).
For a heteroclinic cycle we denote by σj the local stability index along the
heteroclinic connection leading to the node ξj. For ease of reference we re-
produce a result from Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018), which determines
the stability indices for heteroclinic cycles such as those in the RSP game.
Theorem 4.1 (Theorem 3.10 in Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018)). Let
Mj, j = 1, . . . , m, be basic transition matrices of a collection of maps associ-
ated with a heteroclinic cycle. Denote by q = j1, ..., jL, L ≥ 1, all the indices
for which Mq has at least one negative entry.
(a) If, for at least one j, the matrix M (j) = Mj−1 · · ·M1Mm · · ·Mj does
not satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) of Lemma B.1, then σj = −∞ for all
j = 1, . . . , m and the heteroclinic cycle is not an attractor.
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(b) If the matrices M (j) satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of Lemma B.1 for all
j = jp + 1, p = 1, . . . , L, such that jp + 1 /∈ {j1, . . . , jL}, then the
heteroclinic cycle is f.a.s. Furthermore, for each j = 1, . . . , m, there
exist vectors β1,β2, . . . ,βK ∈ RN , such that
σj = min
i=1,...,K
{
F index (βi)
}
.
Applying Theorem 4.1 to each Cp-cycle gives the stability indices of its
heteroclinic connections, where the vectors βi are the rows with negative
entries of the associated basic transition matrices and their product. These
negative entries occur due to the existence of two unstable directions at a
node: at ξ0, for instance, there is one unstable direction towards ξ1 and
another towards ξ2.
Theorem 4.2. For the C0-cycle of the RSP game and any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1),
(i) if εx + εy > 0, then all stability indices are −∞, and the cycle is c.u.
(ii) if εx + εy < 0, then the stability indices are
σ0 =min
{
1− εx
1 + εx
,
(1− εy)2
2 (1 + εy)
}
> 0
σ1 =min
{
1− εy
1 + εy
,
(1− εx)2
2 (1 + εx)
}
> 0,
and the cycle is e.a.s.
The condition εx + εy < 0 guarantees that the payoff for a tie is negative
for at least one of the players. The payoff for winning is considerably higher
than the payoff for a tie from the point of view of such a player. Hence, a
choice of action that leads to a tie on the next round is avoided. The players
only switch to best responses.
Proof. In Step 1, we establish that Lemma B.1 holds if and only if εx+εy < 0.
This is enough to prove part (i) according to Theorem 4.1(a). In Step 2, when
εx + εy < 0, we use the function F
index to calculate the stability index for
each heteroclinic connection in the C0-cycle. We show that both indices are
positive; hence it follows from Theorem 2.5 that C0 is e.a.s.
13
Step 1: Consider the transition matrices M (0) and M (1) around the whole
C0-cycle in (14) of Appendix A.2. Since they are similar
4 conditions (i)–(ii)
of Lemma B.1 will simultaneously hold, or not hold true, for either matrices.
Set then M ≡M (0). The eigenvalues of M are the roots of the characteristic
polynomial
p (λ) = −λ3 + Tr (M) λ2 − B(M) λ+Det (M) , (3)
where Tr (M) and Det (M) are respectively the trace and the determinant of
M , and
B (M) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1− 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
1− εx
2
3 + ε2y
4
−1 + εy
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −
1 + εy
2
0
1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 − 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
1
1− εy
2
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra states that p(λ) = 0 has precisely
three roots λ1, λ2, λ3 ∈ C such that
Tr (M) = λ1 + λ2 + λ3 =
−3− 3εx − 3εy + εxεy
4
, (4)
B (M) = λ1λ2 + λ1λ3 + λ2λ3 =
−3 + 3εx + 3εy + εxεy
4
, (5)
Det (M) = λ1λ2λ3 = 1.
By virtue of the Routh-Hurwitz Criterion (see Arnold 2000), the number
of roots with positive real part equals the number of sign changes of the
sequence
−1, Tr (M) , 1− B (M) Tr (M)
Tr (M)
, 1.
For all εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1) we have
Tr (M) B (M) =
1
16
(3− εxεy)2 − 9
16
(εx + εy)
2 ∈ (−2, 1) ,
4We say that two square matrices of the same order, A and B, are similar if there exists
an invertible matrix P such that B = P−1AP . In particular, similar matrices have the
same characteristic polynomial.
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yielding
sgn
(
1− B (M) Tr (M)
Tr (M)
)
= sgn (Tr (M)) .
Hence, there is exactly one root with positive real part. It is, in fact, purely
real because p(λ) admits three roots. Let λ1 ∈ R and λ1 > 0. We make the
following
Claim: The characteristic polynomial p(λ) has one real root, λ1, and a pair
of complex roots, α± βi.
Let λmax be the maximum in absolute value root of p(λ). Since
det (M) = λ1(α
2 + β2) = 1⇔ λ1 = 1
α2 + β2
it follows that
λ1 = λmax ⇔ λ1 > 1.
We then prove that εx + εy > 0 is equivalent to λ1 6= λmax. Given that
B (M) > 0⇒ εx + εy > 0⇒ tr (M) < 0
and
tr (M) > 0⇒ εx + εy < 0⇒ B (M) < 0
one of three possible cases takes place:
Case 1: suppose that Tr (M) < 0 and B (M) > 0, that is, εx + εy > 0; thus
Tr (M) = λ1 + 2α < 0⇔ 2αλ1 < −λ21
B(M) = 2αλ1 + α
2 + β2 > 0.
Replacing the first in the second equation we obtain λ21 < α
2 + β2, and
therefore λ1 6= λmax.
Case 2: suppose that tr (M) > 0 and B (M) < 0, that is, εx + εy < 0; a
procedure analogous to the one above shows now that λ1 = λmax.
Case 3: suppose that Tr (M) < 0 and B (M) < 0; from (4) and (5) we can
write
B (M)− Tr (M) = 2α(λ1 − 1) + α2 + β2 − λ1 = 3
2
(εx + εy),
and proceed by contradiction.
15
(a) if εx + εy > 0 and λ1 > 1, then λ1 = λmax and
2α(λ1 − 1) > λ1 − (α2 + β2) > 0.
However, the left-hand side is negative as α < 0, which is absurd.
Accordingly, if εx + εy > 0, then λ1 6= λmax.
(b) if εx + εy < 0 and 0 < λ1 < 1, then |λmax| = α2 + β2 and
2α(λ1 − 1) < λ1 − (α2 + β2) < 0.
But the left-hand side is positive as α < 0. Hence, if εx + εy < 0, then
λ1 = λmax.
We have seen that (i)–(ii) of Lemma B.1 are satisfied if and only if εx +
εy < 0. Next we prove that (i)–(ii) guarantee condition (iii) of Lemma B.1
for either transition matrix M (j), j = 0, 1. Let wmax,0 and wmax,1 be the
respective eigenvectors ofM (0) andM (1) associated with the eigenvalue λmax.
In particular, (iii) holds true if all the coordinates of wmax,0 and wmax,1 have
the same sign.
Assume that M ≡ M (0) satisfies (i)–(ii) with λmax = λ1, i.e λ1 ∈ R
and λ1 > 1. Again, by similarity, the same remains valid for M
(1). Direct
computation reveals that wmax,0 has coordinates multiple of(
λ1 +
1 + εy
2
,
3 + ε2y
4
, λ21 − Tr (M) λ1 + B (M) +
1− εy
2
)
.
Due to λ1 > 1 and εy ∈ (−1, 1) the first two coordinates clearly have positive
signs. From Det (M) = 1 and p(λ1) = 0 we get λ1 (λ
2
1 − Tr (M) λ1 + B (M)) =
1, and therefore the third coordinate is also positive. The coordinates of
wmax,1 can be obtained from those given above for wmax,0 simply by replac-
ing εy by εx. Then, analogously, all coordinates of w
max,1 are positive.
Finally, we prove the claim. The discriminant of p(λ) in (3), being a real
cubic polynomial, is
∆(εx, εy)
= 18Tr (M) B (M)− 4Tr (M)3 + Tr (M)2 B(M)2 − 4B (M)3 − 27
=
1
256
[(
ε2x − 9
)2
ε4y +
(−80ε3x − 432εx) ε3y
+
(−18ε4x − 396ε2x − 162) ε2y + (−432ε3x − 3024εx) εy
+ 81ε4x − 162ε2x − 3375
]
.
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For each value of εx ∈ (−1, 1) we can regard ∆(εx, ·) as a real quartic poly-
nomial in the variable εy. Its discriminant is in turn given by
− 59049
67108864
(
ε2x + 15
)3 (
ε2x + 3
)8
.
This is negative for every εx ∈ (−1, 1) and hence ∆ (εx, ·) has two distinct
real roots and two complex conjugate non-real roots. The coefficient of the
leading term of ∆ (εx, ·) is positive. Together with
∆ (εx,−1) = −1
4
(1− εx)
(
ε3x + 9ε
2
x + 54
)
< 0
∆ (εx, 1) = −1
4
(1 + εx)
(−ε3x + 9ε2x + 54) < 0
for all εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1) implies
∆ (εx, εy) < 0
for all εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1). Consequently, p (λ) has one real root and two complex
conjugate non-real roots.
Step 2: To determine the stability index σ0 along the heteroclinic connec-
tion [ξ1 → ξ0] we examine the δ-local basin of attraction of the C0-cycle in
a neighbouhood of [ξ1 → ξ0]. The latter is defined as Bπ0δ in (15) of Ap-
pendix B. We deduce that in the new coordinates (13) the same is described
by means of the matrices M0 and M
(0) = M1M0. Exactly one entry of each
Mq, q = 0, 1, is negative and so Theorem 4.1 states that
σ0 =min
{
F index
(
vmax,0
)
, (6)
min
{
F index
(
1− εy
2
, 1, 0
)
, F index
(
−1 + εx
2
, 0, 1
)
,
F index (1, 0, 0)
}
,
(7)
min
{
F index
(−1− 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
,
1− εx
2
, 1
)
,
F index
(
3 + ε2y
4
,−1 + εy
2
, 0
)
, F index
(
1− εy
2
, 1, 0
)}}
.
(8)
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The vector vmax,0 in (6) is the row of the change of basis matrix from the
basis of eigenvectors for M (0) to the canonical basis for R3 in the position
associated with λmax. Moreover, (7) takes the rows of M0 while (8) takes the
rows of M (0).
Simple algebra attests that vmax,0 is a constant multiple of the vector λ1(α− λ1)2 + β2 ,
4
3+ε2y
[(
α+ 1+εy
2
)2
+ β2
]
+ 1−εx
2
(α− λ1)2 + β2
,
4
3+ε2y
(α− λ1)2 + β2
 .
Hence its entries are all non-negative for any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1). According to
the values of F index in Appendix B.1 it follows that
F index
(
vmax,0
)
= +∞.
Again, non-negative entries lead to
F index
(
1− εy
2
, 1, 0
)
= F index (1, 0, 0) = +∞.
On the other hand, when at least one entry is negative, we get
F index
(
−1 + εx
2
, 0, 1
)
=
1− εx
1 + εx
F index
(
3 + ε2y
4
,−1 + εy
2
, 0
)
=
(1− εy)2
2 (1 + εy)
and
F index
(−1− 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
,
1− εx
2
, 1
)
=

+∞, if − 1− 3εx − εy + εxεy > 0
(5− εy) (1− εx)
1 + 3εx + εy − εxεy , if − 1− 3εx − εy + εxεy < 0.
A straightforward comparison shows that for all εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1)
F index
(−1− 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
,
1− εx
2
, 1
)
> F index
(
−1 + εx
2
, 0, 1
)
and
σ0 = min
{
1− εx
1 + εx
,
(1− εy)2
2 (1 + εy)
}
> 0.
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The proof for σ1 runs as before by interchanging εx and εy in the calcu-
lations so that for all εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1)
σ1 = min
{
1− εy
1 + εy
,
(1− εx)2
2 (1 + εx)
}
> 0.
The stability of the remaining heteroclinic cycles in the heteroclinic net-
work of the RSP game is given in Theorems 4.3–4.6. The proofs are omitted
as they are analogous to that of Theorem 4.2 using the appropriate transi-
tion matrices in Appendix A.2. In the statement of the following results it
is useful to define
b1 = (5− εx) ε2y +
(
ε2x + 10εx + 1
)
εy − (1− εx) (4 + 5εx)
b2 = (5 + εx) ε
2
y +
(−ε2x + 10εx − 1) εy − (1 + εx) (4− 5εx) .
Theorem 4.3. For the C1-cycle of the RSP game and any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1),
(a) if either εx+ εy < 0, or b1 < 0, or εx− εy > 0, then all stability indices
are −∞, and the cycle is c.u.
(b) if εx + εy > 0, and b1 > 0, and εx − εy < 0, then the stability indices
are
σ1 =
−4 + εx + (3− εx) εy + ε2y
(1− εx) (1 + εy) < 0
σ2 =min
{
εy − εx
1− εy ,
1 + 2εx + ε
2
y
2 (1− εx)
}
> 0,
and the cycle is f.a.s.
Along the C1-cycle player Y never wins. When both εx + εy > 0 and
εx− εy < 0, we have that εy > 0 so that player Y ’s payoff for a tie is greater
than the average payoff. Player Y may then settle for a better response,
leading only to a tie, rather than switching to the best response. The bound
set by b1 ensures εy is high enough to sustain continually this choice. The
analogous occurs for player X along the C2-cycle as shown in the following
Theorem 4.4. For the C2-cycle of the RSP game and any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1),
(a) if either εx+ εy < 0, or b2 < 0, or εx− εy < 0, then all stability indices
are −∞, and the cycle is c.u.
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(b) if εx + εy > 0, and b2 > 0, and εx − εy > 0, then the stability indices
are
σ0 =
−4 + εy + (3− εy) εx + ε2x
(1− εy) (1 + εx) < 0
σ2 =min
{
εx − εy
1− εx ,
1 + 2εy + ε
2
x
2 (1− εy)
}
> 0,
and the cycle is f.a.s.
We see that the C1- and C2-cycles are never e.a.s. making them difficult
to detect in simulations. They are f.a.s. in a subset of the complement of the
stability region for the C0-cycle in the two-parameter space, see Figure 3.
Theorem 4.5. For the C3-cycle of the RSP game, all stability indices are −∞
for any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1), and the cycle is c.u.
Theorem 4.6. For the C4-cycle of the RSP game, all stability indices are −∞
for any εx, εy ∈ (−1, 1), and the cycle is c.u.
Recall that along the C3- and C4-cycles one of the players switches actions
in two steps, first to a better, not best, response and only then to a best
response. These heteroclinic cycles never exhibit any kind of stability because
the gain incurred as a result of deviating outweighs the possible loss. Recall
that along C3 player X waits for two consecutive choices of player Y before
switching action. However, if player X were to play immediately after the
first choice of player Y , the C1-cycle would be followed and the average payoff
of player X would increase. The opposite is observed along C4: a deviation
in the timing of play by player Y results in an increase of Y ’s average playoff
by following C2. This justifies the absence of the C3- and C4-cycles from the
numerical observations made by Sato et al. (2005).
The admissible regions where the RSP cycles can be stable are depicted
in Figure 3.
Concerning other alternatives of play other than those studied above, we
have conjectured them to be unstable. The reason for this is similar to that
used to interpret the instability of C3 and C4. In fact, assuming that no player
chooses an action that results in a loss, any other sequence of outcomes has
to be achieved by a timing of play where players do not alternate in making
their choice of action. As for C3 and C4 a deviation from this timing by the
player that is supposed to wait leads to a more favourable outcome for this
player.
20
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
1-1
1
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εx
εy
C0
C1
C2
(
−
1
3
, 1
)
(
1,−
1
3
)
(√
5
5
,
√
5
5
)
Figure 3: Stability regions for the C0-, C1- and C2-cycles in the two-parameter
space. The lines in the figure are: (a) εx + εy = 0; (b) εx − εy = 0; (c) εy =
1−10εx+ε2x+
√
81−24εx−2ε2x−40ε
3
x+ε
4
x
2(5+εx)
; (d) εy =
−(1+10εx+ε2x)+
√
81+24εx−2ε2x+40ε
3
x+ε
4
x
2(5−εx)
.
5 Concluding remarks
We complete the study of the asymptotic behaviour in a RSP game governed
by coupled replicator equations. It is a two-person (bimatrix) game with
asymmetric players. Making use of recent developments in the study of dy-
namical systems, particularly in the study of stability of heteroclinic cycles,
we classify three types of heteroclinic orbits for the two-person RSP game
according to their stability as a function of two parameters. Such parameters
describe the payoffs players receive when the outcome of their choice of ac-
tions is a tie. We allow them to range from almost as bad as a loss to almost
as good as a win. Then we prove that if at least one player has a negative
payoff for a tie, low enough that the sum of payoffs for a tie is itself negative,
both players unilaterally avoid any choice of action leading to a tie. In the
next stage game each player seeks the most favourable outcome towards the
current opponent’s strategy choice (the C0-cycle). This is a situation that is
stable in a strong sense for half of the two-parameter space.
On the other hand, the behavioural adjustment when the sum of payoffs
for a tie is positive is not as stable. Even so it does exhibit some low level
of stability if the payoffs for a tie are sufficiently high. There is now an
incentive to play for a tie. This can be explained by the fact that if one
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player oscillates between a tie and a win, then its opponent that never wins
is not satisfied with the outcome and tries to draw the game successively (the
C1- and C2-cycles).
We observe that the stability regions for the C0-, C1- and C2-cycles are
disjoint. The heteroclinic cycles, C3 and C4, for which play goes through all
possible combinations of outcomes are never stable.
These stability results are consistent with numerical simulations and ex-
periments referred throughout the current work and may help to clarify em-
pirical examples of the RSP cycles discovered in nature and economics.
We note that this two-person RSP game is not zero-sum5, consistent with
Sigmund’s (2011) concern that “For most types of social and economic in-
teractions, the assumption that the interests of the two players are always
diametrically opposite does not hold.” In addition, the payoff matrices re-
flect asymmetry, which is a feature that arises either in interpopulation or
intrapopulation interactions. Social and economic dilemmas between con-
sumers and sellers, firms and workers are typical examples where agents
frequently adopt asymmetric positions. Also, differences in access to, and
availability of, resources asymmetrically affect individuals’ behaviour within
each class of agents. We therefore contribute to a systematic treatment of
the asymmetric version of replicator dynamics in the class of RSP games.
Our results suggest that the two-person RSP game may be a good tool for
modelling cyclic dominance where two fixed players independently exchange
a winning position. For instance, the dynamics of the gasoline retail market
by Noel (2007) have reported that a major and an independent firms alter-
nate in setting the highest price (see Figure 1 therein). If we assume that
consumers buy at the lowest price, the firms can be regarded as switching
to pure best replies in a two-person RSP game where the actions are “fix a
low price” (R), “fix an intermediate price” (S) and “fix a high price” (P).
This corresponds to the win-loss pattern of the C0-cycle. Hopkins and Sey-
mour (2002) have in turn shown that the existence of informed consumers
precludes price dispersion. This is the case, however, in a model where only
the firms are players. The two-person game presented here can complement
the information provided in Hopkins and Seymour (2002) by including con-
sumers as active players in an equal footing to the firms. Price dispersion
then appears not because different firms set different prices but because firms
choose different prices over time. This is in line with the temporal price dis-
persion of Varian (1980).
5We are, in fact, interested in the non-zero-sum game corresponding to εx + εy 6= 0.
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A Transitions near the RSP cycles
In this section we describe the construction of Poincare´ maps (also called
return maps) from and to cross sections of the flow near each node once
around an entire heteroclinic cycle. The Poincare´ maps are the composi-
tion of local and global maps. The local maps approximate the flow in a
neighbourhood of a node. The global maps approximate the flow along a
heteroclinic connection between two consecutive nodes.
Near ξj we introduce an incoming section H
in,i
j across the heteroclinic
connection [ξi → ξj ] and an outgoing section Hout,kj across the heteroclinic
connection [ξj → ξk], j 6= i, k. By definition, these are five-dimensional sub-
spaces in R6. Krupa and Melbourne (2004) have shown that not all dimen-
sions are important in the study of stability of heteroclinic cycles as followed.
A.1 Poincare´ maps
Assume that the flow is linearisable about each node. Locally at ξj, we
denote by −cji < 0 the eigenvalue in the stable direction through the het-
eroclinic connection [ξi → ξj] and ejk > 0 the eigenvalue in the unstable
direction through the heteroclinic connection [ξj → ξk]. As illustrated in
Figure 4(a) each node has two incoming connections and two outgoing con-
nections. Looking at ξj from the point of view of the sequence of heteroclinic
connections [ξi → ξj → ξk], we say that −cji is contracting, ejk is expanding,
−cjl and ejm are transverse with j 6= i, k, l,m, i 6= l and k 6= m (see Garrido-
da-Silva and Castro 2018; Krupa and Melbourne 2004; Podvigina 2012; Pod-
vigina and Ashwin 2011).
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Figure 4: Representation of (a) the eigenvalues and (b) the cross sections
near a node ξj with j 6= i, k, l,m, i 6= l and k 6= m.
The linearised flow in the relevant local coordinates near ξj is given by
v˙ = − cjiv
w˙ = ejkw
z˙1 = − cjlz1
z˙2 = ejmz2,
(9)
such that v, w and (z1, z2) correspond, respectively, to the contracting, ex-
panding and transverse directions. Table 2 provides all eigenvalues restricted
to these directions for the three nodes ξ0, ξ1 and ξ2.
All cross sections are reduced to a three-dimensional subspace and can
be expressed as (see Figure 4(b))
H in,ij = {(1, w, z1, z2) : 0 ≤ w, z1, z2 < 1}
Hout,kj = {(v, 1, z1, z2) : 0 ≤ v, z1, z2 < 1} .
We construct local maps φijk : H
in,i
j → Hout,kj near each ξj, global maps
ψjk : H
out,k
j → H in,jk near each heteroclinic connection [ξj → ξk], and their
compositions gj = ψjk ◦ φijk : H in,ij → H in,jk , j 6= i, k. Composing the
latter successively along an entire heteroclinic cycle yields the Poincare´ maps
πj : H
in,i
j → H in,ij , one for each heteroclinic connection belonging to the
heteroclinic cycle.
Integrating (9) we find
φijk (w, z1, z2) =
(
w
cji
ejk , z1w
cjl
ejk , z2w
−
ejm
ejk
)
, for 0 < z2 < w
ejm
ejk .
On the other hand, expressions for global maps depend both on which
heteroclinic connection and heteroclinic cycle one considers. Following the
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ξ0 e01 = 1 e02 =
1 + εx
2
−c01 = −1 −c02 = −1− εy
2
ξ1 e12 =
1 + εy
2
e10 = 1 −c12 = −1 − εx
2
−c10 = 1
ξ2 e20 =
1− εy
2
e21 =
1− εx
2
−c20 = −1 + εx
2
−c21 = −1− εx
2
Table 2: Eigenvalues of the linearisation of the flow about each node in a sys-
tem of local coordinates in the basis of the associated contracting, expanding
and transverse eigenvectors.
Remark on p. 1603 of Aguiar and Castro (2010), in the leading order any
global map ψjk is well represented by a permutation.
We describe the details for the cycle C0 = [ξ0 → ξ1 → ξ0]. The other
cases are similar, and therefore, we omit the calculations. Notice that
Γ ((R,P)→ (S,P)→ (S,R)) = C0.
We pick, respectively, the heteroclinic connections [(R,P)→ (S,P)] and
[(S,P)→ (S,R)] as representatives of [ξ0 → ξ1] and [ξ1 → ξ0], see Table 1.
Considering the flow linearised about each representative heteroclinic con-
nection the global maps have the form
ψ01 :H
out,1
0 → H in,01 , ψ10 (v, z1, z2) = (z1, z2, v)
ψ10 :H
out,0
1 → H in,10 , ψ01 (v, z1, z2) = (z1, z2, v) .
The pairwise composite maps g0 = ψ01 ◦ φ101 and g1 = ψ10 ◦ φ010 are
g0 :H
in,1
0 → H in,01 , g0 (w, z1, z2) =
(
z1w
1−εy
2 , z2w
−
1+εx
2 , w
)
,
for 0 < z2 < w
1+εx
2 ,
g1 :H
in,0
1 → H in,10 , g1 (w, z1, z2) =
(
z1w
1−εx
2 , z2w
−
1+εy
2 , w
)
,
for 0 < z2 < w
1+εy
2 .
(10)
The dynamics in the vicinity of the C0-cycle is accurately approximated by
the two Poincare´ maps π0 = g1 ◦ g0 and π1 = g0 ◦ g1 with
π0 : H
in,1
0 → H in,10 ,
π0 (w, z1, z2) =
(
z2z
1−εx
2
1 w
−1−3εx−εy+εxεy
4 , z
−
1+εy
2
1 w
3+ε2y
4 , z1w
1−εy
2
)
,
(11)
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for 0 < z2 < w
1+εx
2 and z1 > w
3+ε2y
2(1+εy) ,
π1 : H
in,0
1 → H in,01 ,
π1 (w, z1, z2) =
(
z2z
1−εy
2
1 w
−1−εx−3εy+εxεy
4 , z
−
1+εx
2
1 w
3+ε2y
4 , z1w
1−εx
2
)
,
(12)
for 0 < z2 < w
1+εy
2 and z1 > w
3+ε2x
2(1+εx) .
A.2 Transition matrices
Consider the change of coordinates
η ≡ (η1, η2, η3) = (ln v, ln z1, ln z2) . (13)
The maps gj : H
in,i
j → H in,jk , j 6= i, k, become linear
gj (η) =Mjη
and Mj are called the basic transition matrices. For the Poincare´ maps
πj : H
in,i
j → H in,ij the transition matrices are the product of basic transition
matrices in the appropriate order. We denote them by M (j).
The basic transition matrices of the maps g0 and g1 in (10) with respect
to C0 are
M0 =

1− εy
2
1 0
−1 + εx
2
0 1
1 0 0
 , M1 =

1− εx
2
1 0
−1 + εy
2
0 1
1 0 0
 .
Then, the products M (0) = M1M0 and M
(1) = M0M1 provide the transition
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matrices of the Poincare´ maps π0 in (11) and π1 in (12):
M (0) =

−1− 3εx − εy + εxεy
4
1− εx
2
1
3 + ε2y
4
−1 + εy
2
0
1− εy
2
1 0

M (1) =

−1− εx − 3εy + εxεy
4
1− εy
2
1
3 + ε2x
4
−1 + εx
2
0
1− εx
2
1 0
 .
(14)
ξ0 ξ1
H
in
0
H
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M1
M0
M (0)
(a)
ξ0 ξ1
H
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1
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M0
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Figure 5: Definition of the transition matrices (a) M (0) = M1M0 and (b)
M (1) = M0M1 around the C0-cycle. The matrix M0 corresponds to the
transformation represented by a dotted line and M1 to that represented by
a dashed line.
Analogously, this process yields the transition matrices for the remaining
heteroclinic cycles. We use different accents according to the heteroclinic
cycle: for C1,
M˜ (1) :H in,21 → H in,21 , M˜ (1) = M˜2M˜1
M˜ (2) :H in,12 → H in,12 , M˜ (2) = M˜1M˜2
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where
M˜1 =

2
1 + εy
1 0
1− εx
1 + εy
0 0
− 2
1 + εy
0 1
 , M˜2 =

−1− εy
1− εx 0 1
1 + εx
1− εx 1 0
1 + εy
1− εx 0 0
 ;
for C2,
M˜
(0)
:H in,20 → H in,20 , M˜
(0)
= M˜2M˜0
M˜
(2)
:H in,02 → H in,02 , M˜
(2)
= M˜0M˜2
where
M˜0 =

2
1 + εx
1 0
1− εy
1 + εx
0 0
− 2
1 + εx
0 1
 , M˜2 =

−1− εx
1 − εy 0 1
1 + εy
1− εy 1 0
1 + εx
1− εy 0 0
 ;
for C3,
M̂ (1) :H in,01 → H in,01 , M̂ (1) = M̂2M̂0M̂1
M̂ (2) :H in,12 → H in,12 , M̂ (2) = M̂0M̂1M̂2
M̂ (0) :H in,20 → H in,20 , M̂ (0) = M̂1M̂2M̂0
where
M̂1 =

− 2
1 + εy
0 1
1− εx
1 + εy
1 0
2
1 + εy
0 0
 , M̂2 =

1 + εx
1− εy 1 0
1 + εy
1− εy 0 0
−1 − εx
1 − εy 0 1
 , M̂0 =

1 1 0
−1 + εx
2
0 1
1− εy
2
0 0
 ;
and, for C4,
M̂
(0)
:H in,10 → H in,10 , M̂
(0)
= M̂2M̂1M̂0
M̂
(2)
:H in,02 → H in,02 , M̂
(2)
= M̂1M̂0M̂2
M̂
(1)
:H in,21 → H in,21 , M̂
(1)
= M̂0M̂2M̂1
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where
M̂0 =

− 2
1 + εx
0 1
1− εy
1 + εx
1 0
2
1 + εx
0 0
 , M̂2 =

1 + εy
1− εx 1 0
1 + εx
1− εx 0 0
−1− εy
1− εx 0 1
 , M̂1 =

1 1 0
−1 + εy
2
0 1
1− εx
2
0 0
 .
B The stability index
Each Poincare´ map πj : R
3 → R3 induces a discrete dynamical system
through the relation xk+1 = πj (xk), where xk = (wk, z1,k, z2,k) denotes the
state at the discrete time k. The stability of a heteroclinic cycle then follows
from the stability of the fixed point at the origin of Poincare´ maps around
the former.
As in Podvigina (2012) and Podvigina and Ashwin (2011), for δ > 0 let
Bπjδ be the δ-local basin of attraction of 0 ∈ R3 for the map πj . Roughly
speaking, Bπjδ is the set of all initial conditions near ξj whose trajectories
remain in a δ-neighbourhood of the heteroclinic cycle and converge to it.
We use ‖·‖ to express Euclidean norm on R3. Taking, for example, the
Poincare´ map π0 in (11) with respect to the C0-cycle the local basin Bπ0δ is
defined to be
Bπ0δ =
{
x ∈ R3 :∥∥πk0(x)∥∥ < δ, ∥∥g0 ◦ πk0 (x)∥∥ < δ for all k ∈ N0
and lim
k→∞
∥∥πk0 (x)∥∥ = 0, lim
k→∞
∥∥g0 ◦ πk0(x)∥∥ = 0}. (15)
In the new coordinates η (13) the origin in R3 becomes −∞. For asymp-
totically small x = (w, z1, z2) ∈ Bπjδ the requirement (as in (15)) that the
iterates πkj (x) approach 0 (hence the heteroclinic cycle) as k → ∞ corre-
sponds to all asymptotically large negative η such that
lim
k→∞
(
M (j)
)k
η = −∞. (16)
For M = M (j) we denote the set of points satisfying (16) by U−∞ (M).
Lemma 3 in Podvigina (2012), together with its reformulation as Lemma 3.2
in Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018), provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for U−∞ (M) having a positive measure. The conditions depend on
the dominant eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector of M . We transcribe
the result in its useful form in the following
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Lemma B.1 (adapted from Lemma 3 in Podvigina (2012)). Let λmax be
the maximum, in absolute value, eigenvalue of the matrix M : RN → RN
and wmax = (wmax1 , . . . , w
max
N ) be the associated eigenvector. Suppose λmax 6=
1. The measure ℓ (U−∞(M)) is positive if and only if the three following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) λmax is real;
(ii) λmax > 1;
(iii) wmaxl w
max
q > 1 for all l and q, 1 ≤ l, q ≤ N .
B.1 The function F index
The function F index : RN → R used to calculate the stability indices along
heteroclinic connections is constructed in Garrido-da-Silva and Castro (2018).
For N = 3 and any α = (α1, α2, α3) ∈ R3 denote αmin = min {α1, α2, α3}
and αmax = max {α1, α2, α3}. From Appendix A.1 in Garrido-da-Silva and
Castro (2018) we have
F index(α) = F+(α)− F−(α)
with F−(α) = F+(−α) where
F+(α) =

+∞, if αmin ≥ 0
0, if α1 + α2 + α3 ≤ 0
−α1 + α2 + α3
αmin
, if αmin < 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 ≥ 0,
and
F− (α) =

+∞, if αmax ≤ 0
0, if α1 + α2 + α3 ≥ 0
−α1 + α2 + α3
αmax
, if αmax > 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 ≤ 0.
It then follows that
F index (α) =

+∞, if αmin ≥ 0
−∞, if αmax ≤ 0
0, if α1 + α2 + α3 = 0
α1 + α2 + α3
αmax
, if αmax > 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 < 0
−α1 + α2 + α3
αmin
, if αmin < 0 and α1 + α2 + α3 > 0.
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